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Introduction 
Global financial integration has substantially increased in recent decades. Initially, it manifested itself 
in growing capital flows between developed countries. In response to the removal of capital controls, 
financial innovation and technological progress, financial integration has subsequently spread to 
emerging market countries. Gross and net capital flows between developed and emerging economies 
have increased. Financial integration has also been evident in frequently high correlations between 
asset yields or prices, particularly for certain asset classes such as high-yield corporate bonds and 
sovereign bonds and equities in developed and emerging markets (Graph 1). 
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1  Over US treasury yields; in basis points.   
2  Stripped spread of emerging market bonds, as calculated by JPMorgan Chase; 
prior to 1999, EMBI.     
3    Spread of US high-yield bonds over US Treasury bonds with similar maturity.     
4    January 2002 = 
100.   
5  In US dollar terms. 
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; JPMorgan Chase; Merrill Lynch. 
Many argue that increased integration with global financial markets has been key in imposing market 
discipline on policymakers, and has helped to improve the quality of macroeconomic management. In 
addition, financial integration in emerging market countries has been driven by a belief that it would 
increase growth and reduce volatility. Yet the conclusions from a recent comprehensive study (Prasad 
et al (2003)) of the empirical evidence are disappointing as well as sobering. First, even with a 
systematic examination of the evidence, it is difficult to establish a robust relationship between 
financial integration and growth. Second, there is little evidence that financial integration has helped to 
stabilise fluctuations in consumption relative to income. This could have been expected because 
theory suggests that financial integration would tend to pool risks across borders. In fact, for countries 
that are still at an early stage of integration, volatility of consumption relative to income has actually 
increased. Do these findings imply that the economic, academic literature was wrong (or used the 
                                                       
1  Comments by Philip Turner, William White and Agustin Villar are gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed are those 
of the authors, and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank for International Settlements. 
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wrong model) and that financial integration was a mistake? The following sections attempt to answer 
this question by first discussing events and developments which suggest that it is still premature to 
draw firm conclusions about the effects of financial integration. The paper then turns to some recent 
changes that might increase the benefits of future financial integration. The importance of developing 
efficient institutions, and specifically the role of foreign banks, is discussed by Moreno and Villar in this 
volume.  
What may account for the apparently negative effects of financial integration? 
First, the extent of de jure financial integration, as gauged by measures of financial liberalisation, has 
been uneven. A number of contributions in this volume describe liberalisation measures that have 
contributed to greater openness, including Uribe (Colombia). China, India and Thailand have also 
recently liberalised capital outflows in an effort to dampen the impact of large capital inflows (see 
contributions by the People’s Bank of China, Thirachai, and Mohanty and Scatigna). Nonetheless, 
China and India (the two largest emerging economies) have maintained significant capital controls. 
Moreover, there have been reversals, in which countries - in response to external pressures or in an 
attempt to insulate their domestic markets from the effects of capital inflows - have imposed a variety 
of controls (see Cifuentes and Desormeaux on Chile and Uribe on Colombia). In order to curb 
destabilising speculation in foreign exchange markets, several countries have at various times 
maintained or adopted measures to limit the internationalisation of their currencies, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (see the respective contributions by Hartadi, the Central 
Bank of Malaysia, Ong and Thirachai). Finally, some countries have imposed capital controls to 
prevent the outbreak of crises or attenuate their effects (including Malaysia in September 1998 and 
Venezuela in February 2003). Underlying these varying responses is the reality that financial 
integration involves some well known trade-offs. Policymakers must weigh possible gains from faster 
growth and the opportunity to smooth consumption from country-specific shocks against the greater 
exposure to external shocks. 
Second, the pace of financial integration, as measured by gross capital flows, has also been uneven. 
Following a steep rise during the first half the 1990s, gross capital flows to emerging market countries 
fell after 1996 and have only recently shown signs of recovery. The decline was particularly 
pronounced in Asia (outside China) and in Latin America. Other regions (central and eastern Europe 
(CEE), the Middle East and South Africa) experienced rising or stable inflows. Consequently, the 
empirical evidence cited above refers to a period when financial integration appears to have declined 
over a period in some important regions. 
Third, net capital has flowed from poor to rich countries. Theory predicts that capital should flow from 
high-saving developed countries (where the marginal return to capital might be relatively low) to 
low-saving developing countries (where a high return to capital is expected) and thereby increase the 
global return to capital. Yet the reality has been totally different. Since 1997, the developed countries 
have been running a widening current account deficit, almost entirely due to developments in the 
United States. This deficit has been financed by current account surpluses in and capital outflows from 
emerging economies, notably Asia. In other words, there has been a net transfer of resources from 
developing to developed countries. One reason for this apparent paradox might be that returns in 
emerging market countries are still highly uncertain, notably where debt levels exceed even relatively 
low thresholds (see Reinhart et al (2003) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004)).  
Fourth, in large parts of Asia, the rise in saving relative to investment has manifested itself in growing 
foreign exchange reserves. The experience from the Asian crisis in 1997-98 meant that many 
countries had an incentive to increase reserves to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. Yet, as 
discussed in the papers by the People’s Bank of China, Mohan and Sidaoui, the continued rise in 
reserves raises a number of issues, including monetary control, growth and volatility. 
Fifth, external shocks may dominate consumption smoothing effects. It is true that access to global 
markets can help reduce the fluctuations of consumption relative to income emanating from internal 
shocks. However, if external shocks (nominal as well as real) dominate internal shocks, this benefit 
may be outweighed by the costs of the new external exposure. This will be particularly true if the 
external shocks are related to procyclical swings in capital flows and financial integration increases 
countries’ vulnerability to such shocks.  
There is strong empirical evidence that external shocks (for instance, terms-of-trade changes) are far 
more important in developing economies than in developed countries. Similarly, capital flows to  
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emerging economies are volatile, including episodes of so-called “sudden stops” and closure of 
access to international bond markets.
2 There is also some evidence that a certain threshold of 
domestic market developments and institutions has to be reached before the vulnerability to external 
shocks can be decisively reduced.
3 Most emerging economies are well below that level. This raises an 
important policy issue: should emerging economies pursue financial integration in the hope that 
exposure to and competition from global markets and institutions will strengthen domestic financial 
markets and institutions? Or should they rather develop their own markets and institutions before they 
open up?
4 
Finally, the monetary/exchange rate regime may play a role. Many countries have removed capital 
controls while attempting to maintain monetary policy independence by adopting a more flexible 
exchange rate regime. Bevilaqua and Loyo provide an instructive discussion of how an inflation 
targeting regime has allowed Brazil to cope with recent episodes of “sudden stops” in capital flows by 
combining a credible policy commitment to low inflation with sufficient exchange rate flexibility. In spite 
of significant financial dollarisation Peru has also sought to secure the benefits of a more flexible 
exchange rate while limiting the potential costs. Its inflation targeting regime reduces the risk of a 
currency crisis by allowing more exchange rate flexibility, and an “escape” clause allows monetary 
policy to respond to excessive exchange rate volatility (see Velarde’s paper). Cifuentes and 
Desormeaux point out that the institutional cornerstones of Chile’s current macroeconomic stability 
include a monetary regime based on inflation targeting, a floating exchange rate, as well as a fiscal 
policy based on a structural budget surplus rule. In contrast to other emerging market economies 
facing external financing constraints, there is scope for countercyclical macroeconomic policy in Chile. 
Nonetheless, the broader question of how the exchange rate regime influences average growth and 
inflation in a financially integrated world remains to be settled. Central banks still tend to intervene or 
adjust domestic interest rates in response to exchange rate movements rather than use their 
independence to pursue domestic policy targets. The move to more flexible rates might thus have 
induced more volatility than central banks had anticipated or domestic exchange markets might not 
have been sufficiently deep to cope with the new regime. Moreover, the risk of currency mismatches 
and their potential danger to financial stability was probably seriously underestimated. At the same 
time, episodes of large capital inflows under a pegged regime also pose significant challenges, 
including persistent expectations of currency appreciation, the need for sterilised intervention, and 
overheating in some sectors. Such experiences are reported in this volume by the People’s Bank of 
China, Latifah (Malaysia), Tetangco (Philippines, for an earlier period) and Al-Jasser (Saudi Arabia). 
See also Mohanty and Scatigna.  
To sum up, independently of their exchange rate regime, financial integration can make countries 
vulnerable to external shocks that reduce growth and consumption smoothing benefits. Partly as a 
result, the process of financial integration has been uneven and experienced partial reversals. 
However, as discussed in the following section, some recent trends suggest that countries might now 
be in a better position to weather these shocks and increase the gains from financial integration. 
Some positive developments 
Certain developments in international capital markets since late 2002 have been in marked contrast to 
the sombre conclusions discussed above. Spreads on emerging market sovereign bonds have fallen 
back to almost the levels observed before the Asian crisis, and the returns on such bonds have 
                                                       
2  International Monetary Fund (2003) estimates that there were 21 bond market closures in 1994-2002, of an average length 
of 22 days. Most such episodes appear to be concentrated around well known crises or episodes, such as the period 
around the Mexican crisis in 1994 and the first half of 1995, the Asian crisis in 1997, the Russian crisis in the second half of 
1998, and the period of high volatility in US high-yield markets and in emerging market spreads in 2002. The vulnerability to 
such episodes appears to vary considerably. For example, in 2002, spreads widened a lot more for countries with sub-
investment grade sovereign credit ratings, with the result that it was typically the lowest-rated borrowers who were shut out. 
3  Kose et al (2003) find that the volatility of consumption relative to output rises at low levels of financial openness but then 
falls. Countries above the threshold are all developed. In contrast, Lewis (1997) finds that the relationship between domestic 
income and consumption is looser in countries with no restrictions on international transactions.  
4  The same issue emerged when the United Kingdom went back on the gold standard, and also in the context of countries 
deciding whether to join EMU. 4  BIS Papers No 23
 
recently been significantly higher than those on developed country bonds. The rise in emerging market 
equity prices has also been spectacular as portfolio inflows have recovered substantially. Some 
analysts are sceptical of the sustainability of this rally. Because many emerging economies are 
exporters of raw materials, it is natural that their equity markets have been among the first to respond 
to the sharp rise in raw material prices associated with the global recovery. Moreover, experience 
shows that when interest rates are low in developed countries, investors are prepared to take on more 
risks in return for higher yields. 
There are also signs that “deeper” developments have taken place which, on balance, might reduce 
the volatility of capital flows and the vulnerability of emerging economies to external shocks. Four 
important trends can be identified: reduced vulnerability to shocks, including lower currency 
mismatches; increased use of market-based instruments; deepening of domestic financial markets; 
and greater discrimination on the part of investors. 
First, countries have made efforts to reduce their vulnerability to external shocks. In particular, since 
concerns about debt sustainability have played a role, countries have sought to limit domestic and 
external debt. Chile has maintained low ratios of public debt to GDP, earning an investment grade 
rating that has meant much lower increases in sovereign spreads during periods of global market 
uncertainty. More recently, Brazil and Turkey have taken steps to consolidate their fiscal positions. 
Currency mismatches in private and public balance sheets have also been reduced, which implies that 
a number of heavily indebted economies are now less vulnerable to currency depreciation. In Brazil 
sharp reductions in the proportion of its public debt that is indexed to the exchange rate have played a 
role. Foreign reserve accumulation has recently been significant in Latin America, and even larger in 
Asia. At the same time, ratios of external debt to exports have been kept low in Asia relative to other 
regions. To illustrate trends in currency mismatches, Graph 2 plots the ratio of exports to GDP against 
the foreign currency share of total debt. Countries shown above the 45° line have a foreign currency 
share in total debt that is greater than their export/GDP ratio. The further countries are away from the 
45° line, the greater is the degree of currency mismatch. 
Graph 2 
Currency mismatches in 1997 and 2003 
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Source: Tables 3.2 and 4.6 of Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
Mismatches were particularly large in 1997 (Graph 2, left-hand panel). Most Asian countries, however, 
have in recent years reduced their dependence on foreign currency debt and increased foreign 
currency earnings: Korea is now well below the 45° line. In Indonesia and Mexico, the foreign currency 
share of total debt (both public and private) has also fallen substantially in recent years. While there 
are still significant currency mismatches, preliminary calculations suggest that a number of countries - 
notably Brazil and Turkey - moved closer to the 45° line in 2003.  
Second, international financial integration has encouraged central banks to shift towards market-
based instruments that enhance their ability to respond to shocks. For example, India moved away  
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from the use of cash reserve ratios to the use of repo and reverse repo operations. Seeking to 
enhance the scope of its money market operations and reducing its credit risk, the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore has expanded from foreign exchange swaps and uncollateralised lending or borrowing to 
include sale and repo operations in Singapore government securities (see the contributions by Mohan, 
Ong and Hawkins in this volume). In some special cases, countries have sought to insulate markets 
from large foreign exchange inflows associated with privatisation or large export revenues (eg from oil) 
through the creation of special accounts (see the respective contributions by Sidaoui, Böhm and 
Źdárský, and Mihaljek in this volume).  
Third, there has been a gradual deepening of and improved resilience in domestic financial markets in 
emerging economies, often allied with pension reforms (Chile, Poland, Hungary and Mexico) that have 
helped to increase the base of potential investors. In some cases, governments have encouraged 
financial market development by stepping up central bank issuance of its own securities (see the 
papers by Chung and Velarde). However, this has the disadvantage of potentially exposing the central 
bank balance sheet to interest rate risk and of fragmenting markets by increasing the types of 
securities on offer. One solution, adopted in India in early 2004, is to issue special government 
securities to be used by the central bank in managing domestic liquidity. Some countries have adopted 
legislation to strengthen risk management in the banking sector through improved regulation and 
liberalised foreign bank entry (see Tetangco’s and Moreno and Villar’s contributions in this volume).  
Fourth, international investors are now better able to differentiate between countries, thus reducing the 
risk of contagion. For instance, spillovers from Argentina’s sovereign bond default in 2001 and of 
several crises in Turkey were relatively limited. Similarly, concerns about debt sustainability in Brazil in 
2002 had a smaller impact on countries that were thought to be less vulnerable (eg with investment-
grade sovereign ratings). Finally, while the Yukos event in Russia reminded investors that politics may 
still dominate economics, the absence of spillovers was also noticeable. 
 
Table 1 
Foreign exchange turnover 
Daily averages, in millions of US dollars 



























Latin America        
Argentine  peso   na   na    na  684   na  684 
Brazilian real    4,612    627   5,239   3,127   1,217   4,344 
Chilean  peso   2,282    na   2,282   2,314    na   2,314 
Colombian  peso   371   na  371  669   na  669 
Mexican peso    5,888    4,198    10,086   10,059   10,253   20,312 
Peruvian  sol   203   na  203  251   na  251 
Asia        
Hong Kong dollar    19,016    8,365   27,381   19,967   13,214   33,181 
Indian rupee    2,762    78   2,840   5,313    753   6,066 
Korean won    7,916    1,841    9,757   15,815   5,335   21,151 
Taiwan dollar    2,609    558   3,167   3,869   3,393   7,261 
Indonesian  rupiah   535   17   552   1,419  633   2,051 
Malaysian  ringgit   923   na  923  987   na  987 
Philippine  peso   455   47  502  523  242  765 
Singapore dollar    9,841    3,045    12,886   8,751   8,259   17,010 
Thai baht    1,274    585    1,859   2,088   1,403   3,492 
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Table 1 (cont) 
Foreign exchange turnover 
Daily averages, in millions of US dollars 



























Central Europe        
Czech koruna    1,135    1,099    2,234  965   1,848   2,813 
Hungarian  forint   173   24   197   1,380   2,246   3,625 
Polish zloty    3,376    2,949   6,325   3,400   3,630   7,031 
Russian rouble    4,158    124    4,282   10,631   1,577   12,208 
Israeli  shekel   506   na   506   1,969   na   1,969 
Turkish  lira   231  202   433   1,439  552   1,991 
Saudi Arabian 
riyal 
 840   na   840  689   na  689 
South African 
rand 
 6,846    4,481    11,327   5,682   7,974    13,656 
Memo:        
Australian  dollar   20,076   29,577    49,653   27,046   70,077    97,123 
Swedish  krona   11,466   18,680    30,146   13,811   26,828    40,639 
Swiss  franc   17,767   53,286    71,053   21,143   86,562   107,705 
Total
2   634,650   538,416    1,173,066   943,542   829,896    1,773,438 
na = not available 
1    Including local and cross-border transactions.     
2    Since two currencies are involved in each transaction, the sum of 
transactions in all individual currencies would come to twice the total reported turnover. 
Note: Figures are daily averages during April; sum of spots, forwards and foreign exchange swaps, adjusted for local and 
cross-border double-counting. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Triennial central bank survey of foreign exchange and derivatives market activity, 
2001 and 2004. 
 
Globalisation and financial markets 
Notwithstanding these favourable developments, which might help to attract foreign investors and 
stimulate domestic investment, financial integration may imply that emerging financial markets are 
more vulnerable to certain types of shocks, and that it may be difficult in some instances to find 
suitable instruments to manage these shocks. For example, consider how foreign exchange markets 
(the main conduit for the transactions that occur as a result of growing financial integration) have 
evolved and what this might imply for economic and financial stability. Greater financial integration 
may amplify volatility in foreign exchange markets, and this effect may be heightened by the 
introduction of modern risk management techniques.
5 This creates a risk that market participants will 
withdraw liquidity (ie increase their reservation price or simply halt trading) in the face of stress. Market 
                                                       
5  These techniques rely on value-at-risk (VaR) measures, which are positively correlated with historical volatility: if volatility 
rises above its historical value, the financial institution might become capital constrained and forced to unwind its position. A 
recent example of how market volatility is then amplified is the Japanese government bond market; see Packer and 
Wooldridge (2003, pp 2-3).  
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participants may also have to unwind their positions involuntarily (due to triggers or prudential 
requirements) in ways that might increase volatility in other markets. At the same time, however, 
globalisation may encourage the development of deeper foreign exchange markets, which may 
increase resilience to shocks. The results of the 2004 BIS triennial survey of foreign exchange markets 
indicates greater depth along a number of dimensions (Table 1). First, foreign exchange market 
turnover increased considerably between 2001 and 2004, over 50% overall and even faster in a 
number of emerging market economies. This suggests a significant increase in total liquidity. Second, 
the share of offshore transactions in many emerging market currencies has risen significantly, possibly 
spurred in part by the availability in major financial centres of electronic platforms that lower 
transaction costs and increase market transparency. Third, turnover in forward or swap transactions 
has increased relative to spot transactions in a number of emerging market currencies, suggesting 
greater use of hedging instruments. For example, between 2001 and 2004 net foreign exchange 
turnover in the Korean won forward and swap markets increased 262% and 95% respectively, 
compared to an increase of 83% in the spot market. Rapid growth in forward or swap market turnover 
is also apparent in the currencies of India, Mexico, Thailand and Turkey (from low levels) among 
others. Goldstein and Turner (2004, p  59) suggest that a larger share of offshore derivative 
transactions are characteristic of more liquid foreign exchange markets.
6 
Turnover has not increased in all emerging market currencies. One explanation for this might be that 
central banks have significantly reduced their participation in forward markets as a result of losses 
incurred. The introduction of restrictions on forward currency markets or capital controls could also 
have played a role. For example, the measures adopted by the Malaysian authorities in September 
1998 curtailed forward transactions in the ringgit. The Indonesian country paper describes measures 
designed to limit rupiah lending to non-residents, which would discourage taking speculative positions 
via forward markets (although forward or swap market rupiah transactions have nevertheless grown). 
In other cases, capital controls have induced forward markets to move offshore. In 2003, in an effort to 
dampen the appreciation of the baht, the Thai authorities limited the amount of baht deposits 
non-residents could maintain. This constrained the ability of non-residents to take a long position on 
the baht and even larger long positions in the forward market. In Asia, the effects of such restrictions 
have in some cases been at least partly offset by the development of non-deliverable forward (NDF) 
markets in Asian currencies, which account for the bulk of global NDF market activity.
7 Led by the 
NDF market in Korea (average daily turnover in excess of USD 500 million), NDF markets appear to 
have deepened significantly in recent years (see Ma, Ho and McCauley (2004)). 
It remains unclear whether financial integration has stimulated or retarded the development of 
domestic financial markets. On the one hand, the exposure to foreign competition has helped in some 
cases and foreign investors have also started to purchase domestic currency paper instead of dollar-
denominated paper. For example, in his contribution to this volume, Chung documents the very high 
penetration of foreign investors in the equity markets in Korea. Goldstein and Turner (2004, Tables 5.2 
and 5.3) document increases in bond trading volume and in domestic debt securities outstanding in 
emerging market economies. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that there is further scope for 
improving liquidity in emerging bond markets (McCauley and Jiang (2004)). Furthermore, with the 
removal of capital controls, large emerging market companies with high ratings are also covering their 
external financing needs by issuing bonds in the international market or listing in New York or other 
advanced equity markets. 
                                                       
6  In interpreting the data, it is worth bearing in mind that turnover in emerging market currencies may have been unusually 
high in April 2004, when the most recent BIS triennial survey was conducted. The reason is that there was a sharp increase 
in US long-term rates and in some emerging market sovereign spreads in that month in anticipation of monetary tightening 
by the Federal Reserve. In this setting, investors taking speculative positions in an emerging market currency might also 
prefer to do so offshore, where they are not subject to any foreign exchange restrictions or monitoring by the emerging 
market central bank issuing the currency. 
7  NDFs involve no settlement on the notional value of the transaction. Payments are only made if there is a difference 
between the contracted rate and the actual rate on the day the contract comes due. The settlement is usually in a currency 
different from that of the pertinent emerging market currency (say in US dollars rather than Chinese renminbi) and in a 
jurisdiction outside that emerging market. 8  BIS Papers No 23
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